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I
INTRODUCTION
The right to counsel is one of those "immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the idea of free government,"' and which has been characterized as "the
cornerstone of the American judicial system."' 2 Since mentally handicapped citi-
zens are traditionally seen as persons "to whom attention need not be paid, ' 3 the
need for counsel is "magnified" 4 in civil commitment cases to insure "that there is
someone on the 'outside' " concerned about the handicapped person's fate.5
Unfortunately, the record of the legal profession in providing services to the men-
tally ill has been grossly inadequate. 6 In addition, collateral questions concerning
the specific ethical issues arising in the representation of persons perceived as men-
tally handicapped in the involuntary civil commitment process receive scant atten-
tion.7  These ethical issues spawn many subissues: Are ethical standards for
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I. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)).
2. 4 APPENDIX, TASK PANEL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL
HEALTH 1353, 1366 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TASK PANEL REPORTS].
3. Wald, Basic Personal and Civil Rights, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 3, 18
(1976).
4. TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra note 2.
5. Ellis, Volunteering Children.- Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840,
890 (1974).
6. See, e.g., N. KrITRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 92 (1973) ("superficial and totally inade-
quate'); Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and he Commitment of the Mentally Il, 44 TEX. L. REv. 424, 448
(1966) ("perfunctory"); Weihofen, Mental Health Servicesfor the Poor, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 920, 939 (1966)
("passive"). See generally Perlin, Representing Individuals in the Commitment and Guardianship Process, in 1 LEGAL
RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 497 (P. Friedman ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Representing
Individuals]; Van Ness & Perlin, Mental Health Advocay-The New Jersey Experience, in MENTAL HEALTH
ADVOCACY: AN EMERGING FORCE IN CONSUMERS' RIGHTS 62, 63, 68-69 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The
New Jersey Experience]; articles cited infqa notes 31-39.
7. While there is ample literature dealing with virtually every substantive mental health rights issue,
see, e.g., TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra note 2, at 1422 n.10 (right to treatment) and id at 1431 n.! (right to
refuse treatment), there have been few articles on the question of ethical issues. Among the best are Mick-
enberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerations in Representing Severely and irofoundl Retarded
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lawyers representing the mentally handicapped different from those for other
attorneys? How does the lawyer's role differ in such proceedings? Are competency
of counsel standards different? Are there special Canons of Ethics applicable to
such proceedings? Are the courts even interested in the ethical issues in the entire
process?
Indeed, ethical issues in representation of the handicapped are notably
underdiscussed. Although the Canons of Professional Responsibility and the Dis-
ciplinary Rules of the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responszhdiy
counsel attorneys to represent clients "zealously within the bounds of the law" 8
and to "seek the lawful objectives of [their] client[s]," 9 they are silent on specific
ethical implications of representing disabled clients (or those "perceived"' 0 to be
disabled)."1 Only a handful of cases even discuss the dimensions of the role played
by the attorney in representing handicapped persons. 12 Even those (relatively few)
statutes which make specific provision for counsel for mentally handicapped per-
sons do not allude to specific ethical issues.13
This paucity of legal scholarship, case law, and statute probably results from a
composite of factors. First, the principle of "out-of-sight, out-of-mind" appears
directly applicable, as mentally handicapped individuals are egregiously under-
represented in all phases of the legal process 14 and are rarely afforded specialized
counsel.' 5 Those few handicapped persons who do have counsel are afraid of
"rocking the boat," and ethical questions thus will not be fully aired.' 6 And, since
the underlying legal principles mandating representation of handicapped persons
at commitment proceedings may still be seen as somewhat uncertain, 7 problems
ndividuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625 (1979) and Brakel, The Role of the Lawyer in the Mental Health Field, 1977
AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 467. An excellent overall review of issues involved in the representation of
mentally handicapped persons is S. HERR, THE NEW CLIENTS: LEGAL SERVICES FOR MENTALLY
RETARDED PERSONS (1979).
8. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979).
9. Id DR 7-101 (1979).
10. The issue of "perception" is not an unimportant one. Although similar language is used by the
President's Commission's Task Force (counsel should be provided on matters "related to the existence-or
perceived existence--of a handicap," TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra note 2, at 1368), it is not replicated in
the statutes. Cf., e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9501 (West Supp. 1981).
11. But see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 commentary at 94-97 (Proposed
Final Draft 1981), discussed extensively infra at text accompanying notes 159-83.
12. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1099 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacatedon othergrounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1973),on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S.
957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1129
(D. Hawaii 1976), supp. sub nom. Suzuki v. Yuen, 438 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Hawaii 1977), aJ'd inpart, rev'dzn
part and dismtsed in part on othergrounds, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389
(M.D. Ala. 1974).
13. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-21 to 27 (West 1980); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 9501(1)(M)(i) -
(iii); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9502 (repealed, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 9021(e)(1), 95 Stat. 560 (1981)).
14. TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra note 2.
15. See binfa text accompanying notes 26-60.
16. Cf Perlin, Rights of Ex-Patients in the Communit: The Next Frontiir., 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHI-
ATRY & L. 33, 38 (1980) (explanation of why few cases are litigated by former inpatients against commu-
nity aftercare facilities).
17. Thus, the United States Supreme Court declined to hold in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 552 (1980),
that there is an absolute constitutional right to counsel at commitment hearings; rather, it ruled that in
matters involving prison to hospital transfers, due process will be satisfied if the inmate is provided "quali-
fied and independent assistance." Id at 497, 500 (Powell, J., concurring in part, and speaking for a
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involving ethical issues will inevitably be placed on the "back burner" until the
substantive and procedural issues are resolved more definitively.
Secondly, the ethical issues which are raised serve to trigger issues which legis-
lators and judges do not like to confront. It is this discomfort which has, perhaps,
served as a brake on judicial creativity in insanity defense matters.18 Similarly, the
issues raised by investigating ethical standards in civil commitment representation
may dredge up unconscious feelings which lead to avoidance-by clients, by law-
yers, and by judges---of the underlying problems.' 9
More attention to the ethical issues in question is both appropriate and likely.
First, the issues referred to involve thegestalt of the entire commitment process: If
the attorney cannot present a client's views "in the same traditional, adversarial,
partisan role . . .that is the hallmark of the American judicial system," 20 then a
serious question arises as to how meaningful any representation can be, especially
in a fact setting in which the client's decision-making competence is inevitably and
constantly (albeit sometimes improperly) before the court. 2 1 Secondly, as time
passes and more mentally handicapped persons are afforded legal representation, 22
such representation will likely become diffused. More and more lawyers will rep-
resent handicapped persons before more and more judges. One likely outcome of
this infusion of new participants is that the ethical questions discussed here may
well receive more extensive consideration as additional courts are faced with these
problems.
A topic that is considered even less frequently might appear, initially, to be a
subset of the problem referred to above: What are the ethical issues to be faced by
a psychiatrist (or other expert witness) who participates in the civil commitment
process? 23 There are, however, other issues which demand discrete attention and
consideration; e.g., what are the ethical concerns for such a witness when partici-
pation is triggered by a court request or by the committing agency? How are
conflicts between the lawyer's ethical precepts and the codes regulating mental
health professionals to be resolved?24
Consideration of the significant ethical issues requires examination of the
majority of the court on this point). Although, clearly, nonprisoners cannot have fewer due process rights
than prisoners in such matters, see, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 844 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and
remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982), the issue is still to some extent an open one. See also Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 427-30 (1979) (distinguishing civil commitment from criminal prosecution).
18. See generally Perlin & Sadoff, The Adversary Process, in VIOLENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON MURDER AND
AGGRESSION 394, 401-03 (1978).
19. See, e.g., Perlin, Psychiatric Testimony ina Crimial Setting, 3 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 143, 147-
48 (1975).
20. Representing Individuals, supra note 6, at 506.
21. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 846 & n.12 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct.
3506 (1982).
22. See, e.g., TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra note 2, at 1366-67.
23. Although the issues in question are discussed to some extent in R. SADOFF, FORENSIC PSYCHI-
ATRY 47-58 (1975), a search of the legal literature reveals no article focusing specifically on this problem.
24. Some of the issues in question are discussed, from differing perspectives, in Anderten, Staulcup &
Grisso, On Being Ethical in Legal Places, 11 PROF. PSYCOLOGY 764 (1980); Berger, Expert Clinical Testimony and
Professional Ethics, 7 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 347 (1979); Murray, Ethical Issues in a State Psychiatric Hospital, 9
PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 111 (1979); Weinstein, Pychiatry on Trial- Clinical and Ethi al Problems in the Psychiatric
Assessment of Competency to Stand Trial, 347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 12 (1980).
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problem through two different filters-the lawyer's views and the mental health
professional's views-as well as through both together. Such analyses should be




The title of this article is phrased so that a reader may assume-not unreason-
ably-that "ethical issues" in the commitment process are perceived, or should be
perceived, as different from "ethical issues" in other legal processes. 2 6 This
assumption does not arise from mere semantics, but may very well go to the heart
of the entire process. 2 7 Whereas the historic role of the lawyer has been "not
merely a neutral adviser to the courts but [that of] the ardent defender of the
client's rights and freedoms, '28 the record of counsel providing services to the men-
tally ill has never lived up to this standard.2 9
Before 1975 all surveys were unanimous:
[TIraditional, sporadically-appointed counsel in mental health cases [were] unwilling to
pursue necessary investigations, lack[ed] . .. expertise in dealing with mental health
problems, and . . . suffered from "rolelessness," stemming from near-total capitulation to
experts, hazily defined concept~s] of success/failure, inability to generate professional or
personal interest in [the] patient's dilemma, and lack of [a] clear definition of [the] proper
advocacy function. As a result, counsel. . . functioned "as no more than a clerk, ratifying
the events that transpire[d], rather than influencing them." 30
Individual studies were appalling: A St. Louis survey from the 1960's showed that
patients were released in only two of 1700 "contested cases."'3 1 Similarly, an anal-
ysis of three politically dissimilar, geographically noncontiguous states found
counsel so inadequate that a patient's chances for release at a commitment hearing
were worse with counsel present.3 2
This pathetic record, of course, raises a paradox within a paradox: Lawyers are
traditionally zealous in their representation of clients in testamentary capacity
cases, traumatic injury actions, and insanity defense trials, all areas in which
mental health professional witnesses are regularly subjected to intensive and
exhaustive cross-examination. However, lawyers continue to avoid challenging
expert testimony in matters involving representation at commitment hearings.33
25. For an excellent overview of some of the ethical issues involved, see TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra
note 2, at 1473-89; Roth, To Respect Persons, Famiies, and Communities: Some Problems in the Ethics of Mental
Health Care, PSYCH. DIGEST, Oct. 1979, at 17.
26. Representing Individuals, supra note 6, at 500.
27. See, e.g., Brakel, Legal Problems of People in Mental and Penal Institutions: An Exploratog
, 
Study, 1978
AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 565; Brakel, supra note 7; Perlin & Siggers, The Role of the Lawyer in Mental Health
Advoc ay, 4 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 204 (1976); Van Ness & Perlin, supra note 6.
28. Andalman & Chambers, Efective Counselfor Persons Facing Civil Commitment.- A Survey, A Polemic, and
A Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 46 (1974).
29. See sources cited supra note 6.
30. Representing Individuals, supra note 6, at 501 (quoting, in part, Van Ness & Perlin, supra note 6, at
63).
31. Dix, Acute Psychiatnc Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in the Metropolis. An Empirical Study, 1965
WASH. U.L. REV. 485, 540.
32. Andalman & Chambers, supra note 28, at 72.
33. See, e.g., Special Project: The Administraton of PsychiatricJustce." Theoiy and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ.
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"[N]early every attorney" interviewed in a 1966 survey took the position that " 'we
have no choice but to trust the psychiatrist,' ",s4 and in spite of the creation of
special advocacy agencies, 35 this deference still continues.3 6 The converse is also
true. While courtroom mental health professionals rarely complain about being
cross-examined in estate or contract cases (where mental health issues are collateral
to the controlling issues), they are often indignant when challenged by an attorney
representing a patient in the commitment process (where mental health issues are
the central issues).3 7 This phenomenon is not a mere coincidence. 38
A. Role Conflicts and Their Origins
Any investigation of relevant ethical issues in the commitment process must
begin with an examination of (1) the reasons attorneys experience a serious role
conflict in representing persons subject to the involuntary civil commitment pro-
cess, and (2) why attorneys so often find the transition from any other type of legal
representation to civil commitment cases so difficult. At least seven different
explanations for this role conflict exist.
First, like a majority of the public, many lawyers assume that hospitalization is
always beneficial for the mentally handicapped. The lawyers fail to consider the
iatrogenic illness often caused by hospitalization,3 9 or of the disabling side effects
often caused by the administration of psychotropic medication regularly dispensed
to such patients.4 Although cases such as Rennie v. Klein4 1 have begun to take
notice of these disabling effects, they have remained unknown to much of the bar.
Second, the hospital is a closed system 42 which is impossible to understand
without many hours of study and contact. As hospital administrators control vir-
tually all aspects of the system-access, time, conditions of confinement, communi-
cations--a power imbalance is created. This power imbalance makes it almost
impossible for counsel to deal with his client, to confront witnesses, or to develop
proofs.
L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1971),cited in Comment, The Louistana Mental Health Law of 1977" An Analysis and Ctique,
52 TUL. L. REV. 542, 566 (1978).
34. Cohen, supra note 6, at 450.
35. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52: 27E-21 to 27 (West 1980); S. HERR, .upra note 7, at 58-69.
36. See, e.g., Scallet, The Realities of Mental Health Advocacy." State ex rel. Memmel v. Munoly, in
MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY: AN EMERGING FORCE IN CONSUMERS' RIGHTS 79 (1977); Zander, Civil
Commitment in Wuconsm" The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 503, 555 (court accepted
hospital psychiatric testimony in 94% of sample studied). Contra Tanay, Refctions on a Debate, 8 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. vii, viii (1980) (Zander study may show that commitment decisions are the "prod-
ucts of careful and thoughtful inquiry").
37. Representing Indidsfitl, supra note 6, at 502; see, e.g., M. PESZKE, INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF
THE MENTALLY ILL (1975).
38. See, e.g., McGarry, Demonstration and Research in Competency for Trial and Mental llntess." Review and
Preview, 49 B.U.L. REV. 46 (1969) (characterizing psychiatrists' reluctance to expose themselves to chal-
lenge in an arena where final authority is not their own as "professional narcissism").
39. See, e.g., Kantor & Gellineau, Making Chronic Schizophrenics, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 54 (1969);
Yolles, Mental Health's Homeostatic Slate.- A New Termtoriy, 7 INT. J. PSYCHIATRY 327, 328 (1969). See generally
I. ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH (1976).
40. See, e.g., Zander, Prolirin Decanoate." A Review of the Research, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. RPTR. 37, 39
(1977).
41. 653 F.2d 836, 843-844 (3d Cir. 1981),oacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
42. See, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961).
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Third, in spite of case law43 and statutes44 which forbid a presumption of
incompetency because of a person's institutionalization, in any case involving a
person perceived as mentally ill, credibility becomes an issue per se. If a lawyer
doubts his client's credibility, his perception may have a devastating effect at trial,
especially where the issue before the court centers on whether or not the client
facing commitment is mentally ill.
Fourth, because of the very nature of total institutionalization, a patient will
often find it impossible to bring in coworkers, friends, relatives, neighbors, or char-
acter witnesses to testify on his behalf at a commitment hearing. There may be
other persons (such as hospital staff members, outside therapists, or other patients)
capable of providing favorable testimony for the patient. However, a lawyer must
demonstrate a special degree of ingenuity and persistence to track down and inter-
view these witnesses. Without such persistence, the client's representation will not
be complete.
Fifth, what a sociologist might characterize as the attorney's "rolelessness"
often breeds confusion; contrary to the dictates of case law, both counsel and the
courts often perceive commitment proceedings as nonadversarial. 4 5 The lawyer's
lack of identification with his client often engenders distance between lawyer and
client. Also, there is a lack of clearly stated goals. Unlike a typical criminal trial in
which a defendant is either found "guilty" or "not guilty," or an ordinary civil
case where a cause of action is either found to exist or not to exist, a civil commit-
ment matter does not fit into a discrete paradigm. This void causes ambivalence,
as the lawyer may be incapable of perceiving the characteristics of a "victory" or a
closs."
Sixth, many lawyers possess scant knowledge about psychiatric decision-
making, diagnoses, and evaluation tools. This shortcoming can seriously impede
their cross-examination of expert witnesses. 46 Once psychiatric testimony is elicited
few lawyers have the special skills to evaluate such testimony. 47 Although at least
one recent study shows that with respect to sporadically appointed counsel, knowl-
edge of psychiatric techniques may make virtually no difference in case out-
comes,48 such knowledge must still be viewed as essential for counsel involved in
such representation. 49
43. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 896, 904 (D. Conn. 1974), supp. order 386 F. Supp.
1245 (D. Conn. 1975),supp. order rev'd on othergrounds, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975),cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911
(1976).
44. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:24-2c (West 1980).
45. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1099 (E.D. Wis. 1972), and articles cited therein.
Cf Zander, supra note 36.
46. Thus, the recent adoption by the American Psychiatric Association of a new Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual (DSMIII) requires trial attorneys to learn an entirely new system of psychiatric classifica-
tion based on new diagnostic categories. Compare APA, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) with id. (3d ed. 1980).
47. See, e.g., J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (3d ed. 1981).
48. Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment- Traning ,4ttorneys to Cope with Expert Testimony, 2
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1978) (study involved sporadically appointed counsel).
49. Poythress concludes, for instance, that "trained" lawyers' courtroom behavior was not materially
different from that of "untrained" lawyers because the allegedly "trained" lawyers' attitudes had not
changed. Knowledge of cross-examination techniques alone "did not deter them from taking [the] more
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many attorneys deal ineffectively with
their clients' "differentness." Patients are often passive, frightened, heavily medi-
cated, unable to articulate their wishes forcefully, and unaware of their alternative
options. Because a patient's appearance, manner, dress, or speech may be "dif-
ferent," the lawyer may feel somewhat foolish or awkward representing his client's
views to the court. This "differentness" may engender embarrassment which will
inevitably diminish the scope and quality of the attorney's advocacy. 50
These role conflicts have been analyzed infrequently. Although several law
review articles have alluded to them, 5 1 virtually no case law exists on the impact of
the presence of such conflicts. Even those comparatively rare decisions which
attempt to define the role of adversary counsel in the commitment process52 gener-
ally limit their discussions to an articulation of the role the lawyer should play 53 or
should not play. 54 The reasons for the lawyers' ambivalence and role conflicts are
almost never the topic of legal analysis.
B. Process Conflicts
Beyond role issues involving the approach of the individual attorney lurk other
ambiguities and conflicts which center on the role of the entire legal process in
mental health cases. First, the dispositional phase of a commitment case is ambig-
uous and almost always open for modification (as a partial reflection of the fre-
quent changes in mental conditions and symptomatology of many persons who are
the subjects of commitment proceedings). 55 This ambiguity is inconsistent with
the concept of "finite resolution, '56 a hallmark of legal decisionmaking.
traditional, passive, paternal stance towards the proposed patients." Poythress, supra note 48, at 15. In the
words of one trainee: "I really enjoyed your workshop and I've been reading over your materials and its
[sic] all very interesting, but this is the real world and we've got to do something with these people. They're
sick." Id.
50. Representing Individuals, supra note 6, at 505. See generally Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commit-
ment Proceedings. Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816, 827-31 (1974).
51. See, e.g., Lockwood, How to Represent A Client Facing CWil Commitment, 26 PRACTICAL LAWYER 51, 53
(1980); Poythress, MentalHealth Expert Testimony." Current Problems, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 201, 210-13 (1977);
Zander, supra note 36, at 514-17; Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commtment Process." A Theoretical Frame-
work, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1560-63 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note]. See generally Representing Individuals,
supra note 6, at 502-05, and sources cited therein.
52. See, e.g., State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 283, 249 N.W.2d 573, 576-77 (1977);
Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 231, 1517 P.2d 568, 575-76 (1974).
53. The Memmel decision stated:
However, with the legislature now specifically requiring the appointment by the court of an "adver-
sary counsel," it should be made clear that such appointed counsel has the same function, duties and
responsibilities as he would have if he were retained by the person involved as his or her own attorney.
The duties and responsibilities of lawyer to client in this state are set forth in the Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated by this court. They include preserving the confidences and secrets of a
client, exercising independent professional judgment on behalf of a client, representing a client compe-
tently, and representing a client zealously within the bounds of the law.
75 Wis. 2d at 283, 249 N.W.2d at 577 (footnotes omitted).
54. Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d at 233, 517 P.2d at 579 (characterizing passive approach "as a
means of supporting procedural aberrations in the mental illness hearing [as] an intolerable abuse of the
duty to ensure stringent protection of constitutional and statutory rights").
55. See, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975); State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 390 A.2d 574
(1978).
56. Representing individuals, supra note 6, at 505. For an excellent analysis of the special problems raised
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Second, the lawyer's counseling skills are most essential in mental health
cases.57 Unfortunately, little attention is devoted to teaching these skills, which
becomes a particular liability in the commitment process. 58
Finally, and most importantly, the commitment arena is largely invisible:
Courtrooms are usually closed 59 and dockets merely reflect anonymous initials.6°
Partially for these reasons, the usual tangible and intangible benefits involved in
the successful representation of traditional civil or criminal clients in a courtroom
setting-money, prestige, publicity, peer admiration, pride, political recognition,
even judicial awareness-are often missing in commitment cases.
The lawyer's personal role conflicts, coupled with process conflicts, create a
confused picture for the lawyer representing a putatively mentally disabled person
at a commitment hearing.
C. Duties of the Attorney in the Commitment Process and Resolution of
Ethical Ambiguities
In the commitment process, the attorney is simply an advocate, serving in a
traditional, adversarial, partisan role. He is neither a "friend of the court" nor the
representative of the patient's "best interests."' 6' The definition adopted by the
Supreme Court in Anders v. Caform'a62-"the constitutional requirement of sub-
stantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in the
role of an active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus
curiae"63 -is equally applicable to mental health cases. 64
Few cases have explicitly discussed whether there are additional role functions
for the lawyer in civil commitment proceedings. 65 In a habeas corpus application
challenging the adequacy of counsel in a juvenile delinquency matter, a federal
district court in Wisconsin distinguished a typical criminal action from a juvenile
proceeding, 66 noting that "[t]hese differences-the need to investigate an entire
life, to devise a plan for a useful future and the maturity of his client-emphasize
lawyering qualities which require time to germinate in each case, rather than those
qualities which come reflexively to the experienced attorney. ' 67 This need for
in similar circumstances, see Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 784 (1978).
57. See, e.g., Perlin & Siggers, supra note 27, at 207-10.
58. See generally A. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN THE INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976).
59. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 4:74-7(e) (1982).
60. See, e.g., State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 298, 390 A.2d 574, 582 (1978).
61. Representing Individuals, supra note 6, at 506.
62. 386 U.S. 739 (1967).
63. Id at 744.
64. For an eloquent statement of the traditional view of advocacy, see Freedman, On Advocacy, 1 VILL.
L. REV. 290 (1956). For similar formulations, see, e.g., Blinick, Mental Disability, Legal Ethics, and Profissional
Responsibility, 33 ALB. L. REV. 92, 115 (1968); Andalman & Chambers, supra note 28, at 48. For a similar
formulation from a different perspective, see Halpern, 4ntlcipated Misuse of Pychiatg Under the New York
Juvenile Offinder Law, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 382, 385, 387 n.17 (1978) (citing AMERICAN
SOCIETY FOR ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY NEWSLETTER, Jan. 1975, at 8).
65. Set, e.g., State ex re. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977); Quesnell v.
State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1974).
66. Miller v. Quatsoe, 332 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
67. Id. at 1275.
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"lawyering qualities which require time to germinate" has not been addressed,
even in those few cases which point out, for example, that the patient's attorney
"has a duty to the individual and the legal system to represent his client as zeal-
ously as the bounds of ethics permit." 6 Indeed, a leading theoretical commentary
simply states, "Once the adversary nature of the lawyer's role is reestablished in
commitment proceedings, his role in operational terms resembles that in ordinary
cases.'"69
The use of the word "operational" begs the point. Although the attorney's
approach and perspective should resemble the role in "ordinary cases," this does
not mean that, in preparation of such a case, an attorney has no greater responsi-
bilities than in other types of litigation. Indeed, the role conflict problems man-
date that the attorney's role in the commitment process carries additional
obligations.
A modest body of literature, sketching out the duties of an attorney in a com-
mitment case, 70 has established predictable guidelines. The attorney must famil-
iarize himself with the facts of the case and learn the client's objectives, interview
the client, investigate the case, interview other witnesses, determine the range of
available alternatives, advise the client of potential dispositions, negotiate, protect
procedural rights, advocate effectively at the hearing, suggest dispositional alterna-
tives, and provide appropriate post-adjudicative representation. 7' Each of these
seemingly routine steps in a commitment hearing, though, is slightly different from
its counterpart in the "ordinary case."
Somewhat remarkably, the Michigan State Bar Committee on the Mentally
Disabled, the author of an article on civil commitment representation, 72 did not
consider it too obvious to mention that the attorney should learn the facts of the
case and ascertain his client's position. The inclusion of this "guideline" is pow-
erful evidence that, operationally, commitment cases are not regularly treated by
counsel as "ordinary cases." The previously referred to literature on the inade-
quacy of representation, 73 however, demonstrates that this first admonition may
not be as self-explanatory as it appears.
Further, the initial interview is usually conducted in alien territory, 74 a factor
which may shape interview content. 75 Such an interview environment obviously
differs from the prototypical lawyer-client office interview (or luncheon meeting).
68. State ex re. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 126 (W. Va. 1974).
69. Yale Note, supra note 51, at 1562.
70. See, e.g., S. SCHWARTZ & D. STERN, TRIAL MANUAL FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT (1977), reprintedin
1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 379 (1977). See generall SINGER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW IN NEW JERSEY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1981); Hagel, Defeding the Mentally Ill: A DT'scussion of Nebraska's Involuntaq Com-
mitment Proceedings, 57 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1978); Lockwood, supra note 51; Practice Manual, The Attorneys Role
at the Commitment Hearing. Guidelines and Practical Considerations, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 427 (1978);
Practice Manual, Preparation and Trial of a Civil Commitment Case (Part iI), 5 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
281 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Preparation Part fI].
71. See generaly Representing Individals, supra. note 6, at 507-11.
72. See Practice Manual, The Attornes Role at the Commitment Hearing: Guidelines and Practical Considera-
tions, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 427 (1978).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
74. Lockwood, supra note 51, at 54.
75. See, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, supra note 42, at 13.
ETHICAL ISSUES
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Whereas the client in the ordinary case will usually have little difficulty articu-
lating his wishes, the institutionalized patient may be suspicious, terrified, puzzled,
or simply distrustful of the attorney.
The investigation of the case also will differ in both scope and approach from
"ordinary cases."'76 Obviously, the ability to read and understand the medical
chart is essential to any investigation. 7 7 As an independent psychiatric expert will
probably be "the single most valuable person to testify on behalf of a client in a
contested commitment hearing, 7 8  it is critical that the attorney seek such
independent assistance. 79
All attorneys must have the special skills and sensitivity needed to interview
witnesses in the preparation of any case. The commitment attorney must inter-
view hospital social service staff, other patients, and the patient's friends, neigh-
bors, and employers about both the facts and circumstances of the hospitalization
and the events which preceded it.80 Many of the facts adduced from such investi-
gations will involve new discoveries. As a result, they become critical as poten-
tially valuable leverage in seeking a reconsideration of diagnosis.
Of special importance is the attorney's ability to determine the range of alter-
natives to in-patient hospitalization available to the client: What halfway houses,
community mental health centers, or patient-run alternatives are available? What
economic benefits and entitlements might the patient receive outside the hospital?
Is the alternative program one likely to survive economically in the coming budget
cuts? Is the program one specifically suited for persons with the client's condition?
Although these are classic social service issues, the lawyer representing the patient
must invariably assume the responsibility for answering these questions. More-
over, and more importantly, the court's ultimate determination will turn on the
question of whether the individual can "surviv[e] safely in freedom" 8' without any
alternative treatment. If the patient can so survive, it is not the lawyer's role to
attempt to impose such treatment over his client's objections.
On the other hand, the attorney is obligated to advise the client about all pos-
sible dispositions of the case. He must explore in a nonpaternalistic manner
whether the client's objectives are realistic (e.g., does he meet threshold eligibility
requirements for a certain type of alternative program). If, for instance, the client
is not likely to be released-because there is a reasonable expectation that the
76. The lawyer must be highly aware of "hidden agenda" issues. Such hidden agendas-always a
possibility in any case--may be more subtle and nefarious in commitment cases. Is the commitment
hearing a cover for a divorce matter or a child custody dispute? Is the case simply a "back door" way of
dealing with an adolescent with a drug problem or of attempting to avert a marriage unwanted by other
family members? A lawyer's "lawyering" instincts must be at their highest level to ferret out such issues
within issues. See Representing Individuals, supra note 6, at 514-15.
77. See, e.g., Preparation Part II, supra note 70, at 285-87 (analyzing specific portions of the treatment
chart).
78. Id at 289.
79. As to the patient's right to such an evaluation, see, e.g., Practice Manual, Preparation and Trial of a
Civil Commitment Case (Part I), 5 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 201, 208 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Prepara-
tion Part I].
80. Preparation Part II, supra note 70, at 288-89.
81. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
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court will find that there is clear and convincing evidence 8 2 that the patient is
mentally ill and, as a result of that mental illness, dangerous to himself or
others"8 -the attorney's obligation is to explore with the client all likely outcomes
of the hearing. Just as the criminal defense lawyer must explain to the criminal
defendant that he may receive a far more lenient sentence if he pleads guilty in
lieu of standing trial,8 4 the civil commitment attorney must discuss with his client
the option of signing voluntary papers prior to the contested hearing, because such
a signing might lead to the imposition of fewer restrictions on the client's liberty
than if he contests and is involuntarily committed.
The attorney must, of course, negotiate with hospital staff, the committing
authority and/or family members (all of whom may have radically differing views
as to appropriate disposition) prior to the court hearing. It has been suggested that
"the likelihood of success at this [negotiation] stage is demonstrably greater than at
any other";8 5 the experience of New Jersey's Department of the Public Advocate's
Division of Mental Health Advocacy in representing tens of thousands of individ-
uals at commitment and periodic review hearings over more than seven years cer-
tainly supports this assertion.8 6
At the commitment hearing the attorney must protect the full range of the
client's procedural rights. In certain situations, motions may be appropriate to
challenge the sufficiency of the commitment certificates, 7 or to challenge the
exclusion of the patient from the hearing.8 Decisions must be made as to whether
the patient should testify on his own behalf (or, increasingly, whether the patient
has a right to resist court-directed questioning at such a proceeding)8 9 and whether
other witnesses should be produced (a decision often the subject of sharp disagree-
ment between counsel and client). 90 Even more importantly, the attorney must
educate an often poorly informed court in the nuances of commitment law.9'
While an attorney may assume judicial knowledge of landlord-tenant laws, crim-
inal law or divorce law concepts, such an assumption is often inaccurate in mental
health matters generally and commitment cases specifically.
If it is found that the patient meets the statutory commitment standards, the
82. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 443-44 (1979).
83. See, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 252-53, 344 A.2d 289, 302 (1975).
84. As to counsel's responsibility in a criminal case, see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 768-71
(1970); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1970).
85. Preparation Part II, supra note 70, at 288.
86. See, e.g., Representing Indtviduals, supra note 6, at 510.
87. Set, e.g., N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7(b) (1982) (listing the necessary elements of such certificates).
88. See, e.g., In re Watson, 91 Cal. App. 3d 455, 154 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1979); In re James, 67 Ill. App. 3d
49, 384 N.E.2d 573 (1978).
89. See, e.g., State v. Mathews, 46 Or. App. 757, 613 P.2d 88 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981);
Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 793, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1979); Tyars v. Finner, 518 F. Supp.
502 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (holding that a mentally retarded person who is the subject of an involuntary civil
commitment proceeding may be called as a witness at such a hearing even though he could not be ques-
tioned as to matters which might tend to incriminate him).
90. A client may insist on calling a friend, neighbor or other individual to testify. These wishes
should be followed if necessary, but the client should be counselled about the potential adverse reac-
tion of friends and family who must testify at a trial and how reluctance to testify may result in
unfavorable testimony.
Preparation Part I, supra note 70, at 295.
91. For an expert witness' perspective on this issue, see generally R. SADOFF, supra note 23.
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attorney has additional responsibilities at the disposition stage to suggest alterna-
tives to inpatient commitment. Because most cases do not fall simply into a finite
"commit/don't commit" paradigm,9 2 there is a far greater burden on the attorney
to seek dispositional alternatives than in the "ordinary case." While a court-
appointed probation officer in the criminal process is specifically charged with
finding and monitoring alternatives to incarceration, 93 such officials are rarely
present in the commitment process. The impact of "transitional service" social
staff at hospitals on structuring such alternatives has been little studied but the
findings of such a study would probably show little impact on the day-to-day func-
tioning of the commitment process.94 Individual courts may consider the full
range of social, educational, and religious agencies and may find an acceptable
alternative to the commitment process. 95 Such possibilities place a burden on the
attorney to search out and study such possible placements for his client, while at
the same time avoiding the excesses of what Kittrie has termed "The Therapeutic
State."96
Finally, following commitment, the attorney must be available for representa-
tion at periodic review hearings and on appeal matters. 97 In addition, there are
other duties, including the monitoring of treatment 98 (especially with regard to
medication), 99 protection of civil rights and insurance of due process in institu-
tional determinations, 100 and protection of economic rights.' 0 1 Although these
duties are often viewed as collateral ones, 0 2 the lawyer's ethical duties do not
necessarily terminate at the time of the commitment disposition.
Beyond the "ordinary" commitment case, special problems arise in matters
92. See supra text accompanying notes 70-84.
93. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:45-1 (West 1971).
94. The role of such "transitional service" agencies is before the court in In re S.L., No. A-47 (N.J.
App. Div., Feb. 24, 1982), reprtntedin 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 381 (1981), cert. granted, N.J. Sup. Ct., May
20, 1982 (involving nine consolidated appeals of patients at a state hospital discharged on paper ("pending
placement") but kept in the facility because of lack of adequate aftercare alternatives).
95. See generally Perlin, The Detrstitutionalizaton Myths: Old Wine in New Bottles, in CONFERENCE
REPORT: THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED
20, 26-27 (1978).
96. N. KITTRIE, supra note 6, at 1-4.
97. Appeals of commitment matters are relatively rare for several reasons, including a lack of avail-
able counsel, the paucity of legal issues confronted directly below, and the creation of frequently scheduled
periodic review hearings in many jurisdictions. Note, though, that the New Jersey State Supreme Court
has just amended the court rules to specify that the filing of an appeal from an adverse commitment does
not stay pending periodic review proceedings. N.J. CT. R. 4:74-7() (1982). See generally PRESSLER, CUR-
RENT N.J. COURT RULES 866 (1982) (Comment to R. 4:74-7).
98. As to the justiciability of treatment matters at commitment hearings, see In re D.J.M., 158 N.J.
Super. 497, 386 A.2d 870 (App. Div. 1978).
99. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub noa. Mills v. Rogers,
102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 845 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded 102 S. Ct.
3506 (1982).
100. See, e.g., Davis v. Balson, 461 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
101. See, e.g., Cospito v. Califano, 89 F.R.D. 374 (D.N.J. 1981); Schindenwolf v. Klein, No. L-41293-
75 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 17, 1976), consent judgment reported in 5 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
60 (1981). See generally Perlin, Other Rights in Institutions, in 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED
PERSONS 1001, 1018-24, 1027-28 (P. Friedman ed. 1979).
102. For a rare analysis, see Golten, Role of Defense Counsel in the Criminal Commitment Process, 10 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 385, 408-09 (1972).
[Vol. 45: No. 3
Page 161: Summer 1982]
where the client either cannot or does not express his feelings about possible out-
comes. Most commentators suggest that if the patient remains silent the lawyer
should assume that the client wishes to fight commitment. 0 3 Under any circum-
stances, the attorney is obligated to question friends, families, and others in an
attempt to make a collateral determination of the client's views.' 0 4 It has been
suggested that, in such cases, there should be an always-or-never rule-that
counsel should either always oppose commitment or always acquiesce. 0 5 Such
rigidity seems inappropriate. A collateral investigation should be pursued in each
instance. In any event, the ethical dilemma of whether or not to fight commit-
ment significantly distinguishes mental disability cases from "ordinary cases," and
should be the subject of more sensitive attention.' 0 6
Another major issue is the impact of providing counsel for patients subjected to
commitment proceedings. Although research studies show that patients do desire
representation on a variety of legal matters, 0 7 the actual effect of representation
on patients has rarely been explored. Although Chief Justice Burger characterized
commitment hearings for juveniles as meaningless "time-consuming procedural
minuets,"' 0 8 most studies unequivocally reject this view,' 0 9 noting that the com-
mitment process itself has "considerable potential for therapeutic effect."" 0 The
Chief Justice's characterization has not yet had a profound practical impact,"'
but his concern will probably engender further scrutiny of the ethical implications
of holding such hearings.
An analysis of the structure of the legal services provided at commitment hear-
ings is important to an understanding of the ethical issues involved in commitment
representation. Undisputedly, counsel is best provided through a regularized,
organized system of legal service delivery, established in independent offices,
staffed with full-time advocates whose sole job it is to provide legal representation
to the handicapped." l2 This model, however, is not followed in many jurisdic-
tions." 3 Nor has the private bar vigorously taken advocacy initiative.
1 4
103. See, e.g., Representing Individuals, supra note 6, at 513.
104. See generally S. HERR, supra note 7, at 140-42.
105. See Yale Note, supra note 51, at 1562-63 n.84.
106. For a thoughtful analysis, see Mickenberg, supra note 7.
107. See, e.g., Epstein & Lowinger, Do Mental Patients Want Legal Counsel? A Survy, 45 AM. J. ORTHO-
PSYCHIATRY 88, 91-92 (1975); see also Brakel, supra note 7, at 469-71.
108. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07 (1979).
109. For a direct response to the Chief Justice, see Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance. An Empirical
Response to ChiefJustice Warren Burger's 'Tne-Consuming Procedural Minuets' Theor in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 108 (1981).
110. Ensminger & Liguori, The Therapeutic Signifwance of the Civil Commitment Hearng: An Unexplored
Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 7 (1978); see also Cumming & Goyer, Therapeutic Consequences of the Involun-
tary Commitment Process, 1 AM. J. FORENS. PSYCH. 37 (1979). But cf. Galie, An Essay on the Civil Commitment
Lawyer Or How I Learned to Hate the Adversag System, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 71, 86 (1978) (questioning
"whether the adversary system is the most efint way to determine who is mentally ill") (emphasis added).
111. Perlin, supra note 109, at 109.
112. For a general discussion of the literature, see Van Ness & Perlin, supra note 6, at 67-68, and
articles cited supra notes 26-30. See generally Zander, supra note 36. For a case analysis, see State ex rel.
Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977). On the question of institutional legal services,
see Brakel, Schwartz & Fleischner, Legal Advocacyfor Persons Confined in Mental Hospitals, 5 MENTAL DISA-
BILITY L. REP. 274 (1981).
113. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-21 to 27 (West 1980) (New Jersey Department of the Public
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With this backdrop, the Task Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues of the Presi-
dent's Commission on Mental Health formulated specific advocacy
recommendations:
The panel suggests that the Commission endorse a Federal mechanism or, in the alter-
native, urge States to develop advocacy systems which are (1) able to respond to the legal
needs of mentally disabled persons and (2) independent of providers of mental health and
developmental disability services. An essential feature of such advocacy systems should be
their effort to provide a continuity of legal services to such persons at all stages of their
contact with the mental disability system. Such advocacy systems should provide services
at involuntary-commitment proceedings and to institutionalized persons of all ages, as well
as to community residents, in matters involving institutionalization (commitment, release,
treatment issues), the fact of present or former institutionalization (availability of economic
benefits, aftercare, denial of civil rights, employment, education issues), and other matters
related to the existence--or perceived existence--of a handicap (domestic relations, con-
tracts, wills, tenancy issues). In addition to attorneys (an "indispensable element in seeking
and securing many types of remedies"), the advocacy system should be staffed by persons
trained as "mental health professionals" (e.g., social workers and psychologists who provide
advocacy services), by lay advocates, and by present and former recipients of mental health
services, so as to provide a full-time staff with the necessary academic training and practical
experience to provide comprehensive advocacy services for its clientele. 1 15
This recommendation was specifically endorsed by the President's Commission
which recommended "the establishment of advocacy systems for the representa-
tion of mentally disabled individuals,"' 1 6 noting that such systems were essential
"to protect the rights of all who receive services."' 17
Although a modified and diluted version of this recommendation was ulti-
mately passed by Congress as part of the Mental Health Systems Act,"3 it was
repealed less than one year after enactment as part of President Reagan's
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981. I t9 New initiatives in the area will not likely
come from Washington in the near future. President Reagan expects the private
bar to provide necessary legal services to the poor if and when the Legal Services
Corporation is reduced; 2 0 it is not clear what his expectations are regarding the
Advocate's Division of Mental Health Advocacy); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.09 (McKinney 1978)
(New York Mental Health Information Service); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.85 (West 1980) (Ohio
Legal Rights Service for the Mentally Retarded).
114. See, e.g., TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra note 2, at 1371 (recommending that local and state bar
associations begin to train members of the private bar and establish lawyer referral panels "so as more
effectively and adequately to represent mentally handicapped persons"). But see Herr, The New Clients.-
Legal Services for Mentaly Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 553, 572 n. 116 (1979) (recognizing contributions
of selected private practitioners in major mental disability litigation).
115. TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra note 2, at 1368.
116. 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT 42 (1978).
117. Id (emphasis added).
118. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9502 (West 1980). The bill, as passed, authorized the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to make grants to projects "to protect and advocate the rights of mentally ill individuals."
42 U.S.C.A. § 9502(a)(1) (West 1980).
119. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 902(e)(1), 95 Stat. 560 (1981).
120. On March 10, 1981, President Reagan proposed eliminating the Legal Services Corporation. 39
CONG. Q. 466 (1981). After a coalition of judges, lawyers, and American Bar Association officials mounted
a nationwide campaign to save the Corporation, see, e.g., id. at 529, Senate and House conferees agreed to
remove the reauthorization question from the omnibus reconciliation bill, i. at 1421. (This action fol-
lowed the passage of separate bills which would have reauthorized the Corporation at significantly dif-
ferent funding levels: the House bill (H.R. 3480) called for $241,000,000 per year; while the Senate bill (S.
1377) mandated $100,000,000 annually (compared to a current level of $321,300,000). Id. at 1255 (1981)).
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provision of such services for the mentally disabled.
D. When Incompetency of Counsel Violates Due Process
Surprisingly, the uniqueness of commitment representation has not generated
case law on the degree of attorney incompetence necessary to violate due process.
The traditional test for measuring competency of counsel was whether the
trial' 2 1 "was a farce, or a mockery of justice."'' 22 Following the Supreme Court's
decision in McMann v. Richardson ,123 which held that due process contemplates "the
effective assistance of competent counsel,"' 1 4 however, a majority of the circuits
began to rephrase the traditional formulation. 25 Thus, courts have held that rep-
resentation "should be within the range of competence expected of attorneys in
criminal cases,"' 1 6 or that it should reflect "the exercise of the customary skill and
knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place,"' 12 7 or that it should be
"reasonably likely to render and [shall be] rendering reasonably effective assis-
tance,"'' 28 or simply that representation should be "reasonably competent and
effective." 29
Clearly, all of the new standards are "more demanding" or "more stringent"' 30
than the "farce or mockery" test which was recently criticized as "increasingly
inaccurate" as a "protection actually afford[ing] the rights of the accused.' 1 3 1 To
emphasize this greater stringency, some courts have even created checklists of min-
imal performance standards. 132 Only a handful of cases decided under any of these
121. Case law which has developed in this regard should be seen as applicable to the involuntary civil
commitment process, in spite of the Supreme Court's decision in Addington v. Texas, 411 U.S. 418 (1979).
See infia text accompanying notes 139-50. This proposition is true regardless of whether the commitment
proceeding is demonstrated as "civil" or "criminal." As the court noted recently in Tyars v. Finner, 518 F.
Supp. 502, 508-09 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (a post-Addinglon case):
Federal courts have consistently determined that Gault teaches protection against compelled self-
incrimination extends to any proceeding, whether labeled "civil" or "criminal," which could result in
the deprivation of an individual's liberty. Warren v. Harvey, 472 F. Supp. 1061 (D. Conn. 1979); Ruf/lr
v. Phelps Memorial Hospital, 453 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kanteles v. Wheelock, 439 F. Supp. 505
(D.N.H. 1977); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F 2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); and Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F, Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) vacated and remanded on other grounds at 414 U.S. 473, 94 S. Ct. 713, 38 L.
Ed. 2d 661 (1974); [on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 E.D. Wis. 1974); vacated and remanded at 421 U.S.
957, 95 S. Ct. 1943, 44 L. Ed. 2d 445 (1975); reinstated at 413 F. Supp. 1318 (1976)]. [Lessard was
remanded twice by the United States Supreme Court for defects other than its self-incrimination
rationale, which was based heavily on Gault.]
122. Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977); see
also Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977).
123. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
124. Id at 771.
125. In federal jurisdictions, the test apparently stems from the decision of Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d
667 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). For an excellent analysis of all circuits, see Dyer v.
Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1981). The relevant literature is cited in
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329 n.5 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
126. United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978).
127. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970).
128. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 697 (6th Cir. 1974).
129. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1327.
130. Dyer v. Crisp, 615 F.2d at 278.
131. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1329.
132. See, e.g., Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d
1197, 1203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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criteria, however, have focused on the specific responsibilities of counsel when a
criminal defendant's mental responsibility is in question. 3 3
Those few reported decisions have stressed that failure to "discuss" or
"explore" the insanity defense in the appropriate case is "outside the range of com-
petency expected of [counsel] as a defense attorney in a criminal case involving a
very serious charge."' 1 34 Especially where the evidence against the defendant was
so strong that "the defense of insanity was the only reasonable defense avail-
able," 1 35 or where "the trial was certain to result in a conviction unless an insanity
defense prevailed,"'' 36 failure "to explore the one avenue which offered a ray of
promise"' 137 would deprive the defendant of effective assistance of counsel.
Only one litigated case applies these principles to the commitment process.13
The record of the bar in providing counsel sadly demonstrates a lack of "reason-
ably effective" or "reasonably competent" representation. Lawyers who believe
that "we have no choice but to trust the psychiatrist," ' 3 9 or who disregard their
clients' position because "they're sick"' 140 simply do not meet sixth amendment due
process standards. Most likely, the lack of reported cases merely reflects a lack of
appellate counsel willing to litigate mental health issues.
Analysis of criminal cases raises an additional question: How appropriate is it
to analogize the civil commitment process to the criminal process after the
Supreme Court's decision in Additngton v. Texas? '4' Addington held that for purposes
of allocating the burden of proof, it is "inappropriate"'' 42 to merely engraft the
criminal model onto commitment proceedings. Addington makes clear that since
"the possible injury to the individual [of inappropriate confinement] is signifi-
cantly greater than any possible harm to the state . . . the outcome of a civil
commitment proceeding is [thus] of such weight and gravity" as to make the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard inappropriate. 43  On the other hand,
because "state power is not exercised in a punitive sense"' 144 and because "the ini-
tial inquiry in a civil commitment proceeding is very different from the central
issue in either a delinquency proceeding or a criminal prosecution,"' 4 5 the
"heavy' '146 "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard would similarly be improper. 147
The court compromised in an attempt to "strike . . . a fair balance between the
rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the state"I4 8 and mandated
133. See zinra notes 134-36.
134. Springer v. Collins, 444 F. Supp. 1049, 1065 (D. Md. 1977).
135. Mendenhall v. Hopper, 453 F. Supp. 977, 986 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
136. Wood v. Zahradnick, 578 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1978).
137. Id
138. In re Hutchinson, 279 Pa. Super. 401, 421 A.2d 261 (1980).
139. Cohen, supra note 6, at 450.
140. Poythress, supra note 48, at 15.
141. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
142. Id at 431-32.
143. Id at 427-28.
144. Id
145. Id at 429-30.
146. Id at 427-28.
147. Id. at 430-31.
148. Id at 431-32.
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that the evidentiary standard should be "equal to or greater than 'clear and
convincing'." 149
The Court expressed several concerns in Addington. The Court viewed the civil
commitment proceeding as benevolent, specifically rejecting the appellant's asser-
tion "that the release of a genuinely mentally ill person is no worse for the indi-
vidual than the failure to convict the guilty."' 5 0 Also, it acknowledged that if
"beyond a reasonable doubt" were to be employed, "the uncertainties of psychi-
atric diagnosis"' 5' might impose an insurmountable burden and might "thereby
create an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment."'
' 52
Addington should not diminish reliance on criminal case analogies in compe-
tency of counsel analyses. Although the subsequent case of Vtek v. Jones' 53 stopped
short of mandating counsel in all prison-hospital transfer cases,' 54 other courts
have regularly held-for purposes of determining the right to counsel-that sixth
amendment considerations apply to the commitment process.' 5 5 The allocation of
the burden of proof in Addington does not render criminal case precedents on the
question of effective representation inapplicable. 156
E. The Bar's View on Ethical Dilemmas in Representing the Mentally
Disabled
The history of the provision of inadequate counsel to the mentally disabled has
not inflamed the passions of the nation's judiciary, nor has it resulted in any dis-
cernible clarion call by the courts for the provision of vigorous legal advocacy.
Although Justice Blackmun pointed out some nine years ago that it was "perhaps
remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on [the commitment]
power have not been more frequently litigated,"' 57 the subsequent increase in such
litigation has not engendered judicial awareness of the ethical issues involved in
such representation. Even those cases which have sketched out the appropriate
role of counsel'3 8 have employed hortatory language, with little consideration of
149. Id. at 433-34.
150. Id at 429-30.
151. Id
152. Id
153. 445 U.S. 552 (1980).
154. Id at 1265-67.
155. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1097-1100 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1973), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d
393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
156. The related criminal/mental health ethical question of whether the insanity defense may be
imposed upon a competent criminal defendant over his objection is not within the scope of this article. For
analyses of this question, see, e.g., Singer, The Imposition of the Insanity Defense on an Unwilling Defendant, 41
OHIO ST. L.J. 637 (1980); Note, The Right and Responsibility of a Court to Impose the Insanity Defense Over the
Defendant's Objection, 65 MINN. L. REV. 927 (198 1); see also Perlin, Overview of Rights in the Criminal Process, in
3 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 1879, 1896 (P. Friedman ed. 1979). The most impor-
tant recent cases are State v. Khan, 175 N.J. Super. 72, 417 A.2d 592 (App. Div. 1980), and Frendak v.
United States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979). For a recent forum on this topic, see Ask the Experts, 7
NEWSLETTER AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 28-31 (Aug. 1982).
157. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972).
158. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S.
473 (1973), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957
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the specific ethical dilemmas which frequently surface.
Finally, the American Bar Association (ABA) has begun, belatedly, to consider
some of the ethical dilemmas involved in the representation of the mentally dis-
abled. As part of its Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards' redraft
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 159-rules drafted to provide "a comprehen-
sive rethinking of the ethical premises and problems of the profession of the
law"' 6 -the ABA spoke, specifically, about the lawyer's duty to a "client under a
disability."' 16 1 According to the ABA Commission:
Rule 1.14 Client Under a Disability
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with
the representation is impaired, whether because of minority, mental disability or for some
other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-
lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) A lawyer shall secure the appointment of a guardian or other legal representative, or
seek a protective order with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonably believes
that the client cannot adequately communicate or exercise judgment in the client-lawyer
relationship. 1
62
The Commission notes, in its commentary, that "maintaining the ordinary
client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects" when the client "suf-
fers from a mental disorder."' 163 Although such a client "may have no authority to
make legally binding decisions," he may still have "the ability to understand,
deliberate upon and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own
well-being." 164 The fact of disability "does not diminish the lawyer's obligation to
treat the client with attention and respect"; 65 however, where a legal representa-
tive or guardian has been appointed for the client, "the lawyer should look to the
representative for decisions on behalf of the client,"' 166 and, where such a represen-
tative has not been appointed, "the lawyer should see to such an appointment
where it would serve the client's best interests."' 16 7 On the other hand, if the
lawyer represents the guardian and is aware that the guardian "is acting adversely
to the ward's interest," the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the
guardian's misconduct.168
The commentary warns, however, that disclosure of the client's disability "can
(1975), rei nstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). State ex feZ Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 126
(W. Va. 1974); Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1974).
159. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL RULES].
160. Kutak, Chairman's Introdutwon, MODEL RULES, supra note 159, at i.
161. MODEL RULES, supra note 159, Rule 1.14.
162. Id




167. Id at 94-95.
168. Id at 94. The commentary cites, in support of this position, its Draft Rule 1.2(d). That rule
states:
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know is criminal or fraudulent, or in the preparation of a written instrument containing terms the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know are legally prohibited, but a lawyer may counsel or assist a
client in a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
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adversely affect the client's interests," potentially leading, for example, "to pro-
ceedings for involuntary commitment."'' 69 It characterizes the lawyer's position as
"an unavoidably difficult one" and counsels that the lawyer consult "an appro-
priate diagnostician for guidance" if possible.
70
The "legal background" to the draft rule refers to the "growing volume of
literature concerning the disabled client's rights and counsel's role,"', 7 citing the
relevant scholarship and case law.' 72 It notes the generally inadequate level of
representation provided, 73 and casts the blame, in part, on "the lawyer's ambig-
uous relationship with the disabled client and . . .uncertainty about the advo-
cate's role in the quasi-adversary proceeding."'
' 74
The lawyer's relationship with a disabled client "ordinarily should not differ
from the normal client-lawyer relationship;"'' 75 the lawyer "is not the client's
guardian and is not empowered to substitute his own conception of 'best interest'
for that of the client. 1 76 Further, a "disabled client is entitled to reasonable com-
petence, preparation and communication in the representation;"" 7 7 although
"civil commitment . . . [is] not adversary in the usual sense, the lawyer must per-
form with appropriate diligence." 78
The commentary notes further that the lawyer, in the course of representation,
interacts with third persons "whose interests may conflict with the interests of the
disabled client,"'' 79 and warns that "the lawyer's vigor and independent judgment
may not be adversely affected by these other interests."' 18 0 Where conflict exists
between the client's interests and that of his court-appointed representative, "the
lawyer may seek to have that conflict judicially resolved." 8 On the other hand,
where the client's disability "may prevent effective communication or reliance on
the client's judgment," the lawyer should seek the appointment of a legal
representative. 182
Although the draft rule and its accompanying commentary are an important
first step toward official recognition of the ethical problems in the representation of
169. Id at 95.
170. Id
171. Id., LegalBackground to Rule 1.14, at 95.
172. Id. at 95-96.
173. Id. at 96 (citing Andalman & Chambers, supra note 28); Cohen,supra note 6; Litwack, supra note
50; Mickenberg, supra note 7.
174. MODEL RULES, supra note 159, Legal Background to Rule 1.14, at 96 (citing Cohen, supra note 6;
Litwack, supra note 50; Lockwood, supra note 51; Yale Note, supra note 51). It is not clear from which of
these articles the concept of the civil commitment hearing as a "quasi-adversary proceeding" is purportedly
developed.
175. MODEL RuLES, supra note 159, Legal Background to Rule 1.14, at 96 (citing, inter alia, Stateexrel
Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977)).
176. MODEL RULES, supra note 159, Legal Background to Rule 1.14, at 96 (citing, inter alia, Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972)).
177. MODEL RULES, supra note 159, Legal Background to Rule 1.14, at 97.
178. Id. (citing, inter a/ia, State cx. rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 126 (W. Va. 1974)); State ex
rel Memmel v. Mundy.
179. MODEL RULES, supra note 159, Legal Background to Rule 1.14, at 97.
180. Id But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07 (1979).
181. MODEL RULES, supra note 159, Legal Background to Rule 1.14, at 97. See, e.g., In re S.W., 158 N.J.
Super. 22, 385 A.2d 315 (App. Div. 1978).
182. MODEL RULES, supra note 159, Legal Background to Rule 1.14, at 97.
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the mentally disabled, they fall far short of the stated goal that they be "consistent,
comprehensive and constitutional."' 18 3 First, they are internally inconsistent.
They suggest that the lawyer's relationship with a disabled client should not differ
from the normal client-lawyer relationship, and then characterize the proceedings
in question as "quasi-adversar[ial]," implying a different set of relationships than
in the "normal" case. They caution that the lawyer should beware of the third
party with conflicting interests (including, specifically, physicians), 18 4 but suggest
consulting with "an appropriate diagnostician for guidance" on whether to raise
the client's disability; the Rules do not consider the possibility that the "physician"
and "diagnostician" may be the same person. Although the commentary cites Les-
sard v. Schmidt 18 5 for the proposition that the lawyer cannot "substitute his own
conception of 'best interest' " for that of his client, the commentary concedes that
the lawyer should "see to" the appointment of a guardian ad litem "where it
would serve the client's best interests."' 1 6
Second, the rule is not comprehensive. It ignores some of the most serious eth-
ical dilemmas facing counsel representing mentally handicapped persons,
including the patient's refusal of psychotropic medication, 1 7 imposition of the
insanity defense over a competent defendant's objections,'" and the right of a
patient to control his own funds.18 9
Finally, the rule may not be constitutional if it views the civil commitment
proceeding as "quasi-adversar[ial]." Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Addington v. Texas,19° persons facing involuntary civil commitment-and
the concomitant loss of liberty' 9 1 -have a right to the same "traditional, adver-
sarial, partisan" counsel that "is the hallmark of the American judicial system."',9 2
To suggest that they have less implies that the Bar Commission, in spite of its lofty
aims, fails to seriously consider the problems faced by mentally disabled persons in
the legal system.
The draft rule has not received extensive commentary. An analysis by the legal
consultant to the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards
merely notes that "the normal relationship with a competent client is not neces-
sarily the same as a normal relationship with a disabled client,"' 9 3 that the dis-
abled client "creates special burdens for the lawyer," 94 and, thus, that "the lawyer
183. Kutak, supra note 160, at vi.
184. MODEL RULES, supra note 159, Legal Background to Rule 1.14, at 97.
185. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounr, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remana, 379 F.
Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F.
Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
186. MODEL RULES, supra note 159, comment to Rule 1.14, at 94-95.
187. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), uacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982).
188. Set, e.g., State v. Khan, 175 N.J. Super. 72, 417 A.2d 592 (App. Div. 1980).
189. See, e.g., Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (E.D. Pa. 1974),further proceedings,
426 F. Supp. 1297 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aj'd, 558 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
190. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
191. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
192. Representing Individuals, supra note 6, at 506.
193. Patterson, An Analysis of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 31 MERCER L. REV. 645,
659 (1980).
194. Id at 660.
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has greater discretion in the representation of these clients than he has in the repre-
sentation of normal clients."' 95 The extent of this "discretion" is not elucidated,
nor is the type of discrimination necessary to differentiate between a "normal"
client and any other ("abnormal"?) client explained. It is hoped that further anal-
yses will probe the full implications of the draft rule.
III
THE DOCTOR'S VIEW
In addition to ethical issues which directly affect the lawyer's role, there are
other equally important ethical matters for the psychiatrist working with the
lawyer representing a patient in the commitment process. These include at least
one structural issue-the significance of philosophical and professional orientation
differences between the psychiatrist and the mental health advocate-and two
substantive ones: The issue of agency (whom does the psychiatrist really repre-
sent?) and the multiple aspects of the doctor-patient relationship also relevant to
the commitment process, including confidentiality, privileged communications,
and informed consent.
The basic function of a psychiatrist treating a mentally ill individual is to
attend to the medical needs of the patient.' 96 The psychiatrist functions as the
agent of the patient in order to provide the best medical-psychiatric care and treat-
ment available. In this regard, he must be more concerned with perceived medical
needs of the patient than with the patient's wishes or desires. If the patient desires
treatment different from what the psychiatrist believes is in his best medical
interest, the psychiatrist may face the ethical conflict of either providing quality
medical care against the wishes of his patient, or giving what he believes is inade-
quate medical treatment consistent with the wishes of his patient.' 9 7
The attorney representing the wishes of the patient, by contrast, does not focus
upon the patent's medical needs but upon his client's expressed wishes., 98 When
the client's wishes are contrary to the psychiatrist's opinion about the medical
needs of the patient, a conflict develops which may require judicial resolution.
The judge, or his designee, must decide what is appropriate, 19 9 considering both
the patient's medical needs and his expressed wishes.
The psychiatrist, in reaching his opinion about commitment of the patient,
must consider the patient's diagnosis, his prognosis, his degree of competency in
195. Id
196. Statement of Ethics for Psychiatn'sts, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1061 (1973).
197. Id. § 6, at 1062.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64. The lawyer's denomination of the person at risk as a
"client" and the doctor's characterization of him as a "patient" are not merely semantic differences, but
tend to put the entire picture into a more appropriate perspective.
199. Federal Judge David Bazelon has characterized the court's role:
No judge would claim the ability to prescribe a particular therapy for a "chronic undifferentiated
schizophrenic." But neither would any judge allocate [broadcasting] frequencies to avoid [radio]
interference. That is not his task in either case; his role rather is to determine whether a capable
expert has studied the problem fully and reached a defensible result.
Bazelon, mplementig the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 745 (1969); see also Bazelon, Psychiatrists
and the Adversag Process, SCIENTIFIC AM., June 1974, at 18, 23.
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making decisions about his treatment,2 0° and his degree of "dangerousness."120 '
Each of these concepts is poorly defined and psychiatric evaluation of them is
markedly unreliable.20 2 The diagnosis given is a label which reflects a collection of
symptoms, observations and experience on the part of the diagnosing psychia-
trist.20 3 Psychiatrists differ in their diagnoses of patients depending upon their
own professional orientation, background, education, experience, and age. 20 4
Generally, the more severe the symptoms and the more extreme the illness, the
more consistent and reliable will be the diagnosis. 20 5 However, diagnoses vary
even among experienced and skillful psychiatrists depending upon their frames of
reference. 20 6 Since diagnosis implies prognosis and form of treatment,20 7 the unre-
liability of the diagnosis naturally leads to a similar unreliability in prognosis and
in the recommendations for treatment.
The concept of "dangerousness" is even more vague than is mental illness.
"Dangerousness" is not a medical concept but a legal one,20 8 and involves a pre-
diction regarding future violent behavior, either to one's self or to others. Many
researchers have concluded that psychiatrists are poor predictors of dangerous-
ness. 20 9 The prediction of dangerousness by psychiatrists is, in fact, often linked to
the type of mental illness, the degree of its severity, and to the type, extent, and
place of treatment. 2 0
In the assessment of dangerousness, psychiatrists traditionally consider: (1) any
history of previous violent or suicidal behavior;2 1 ' (2) observable factors such as
depression, agitation, anxiety, presence or absence of delusions and/or hallucina-
200. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 846 n.12 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct.
3506 (1982).
201. For a full discussion of the different meanings of "dangerousness," see, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J.
236, 259-62, 344 A.2d 289, 296-98 (1975).
202. See, e.g., Ash, The Reiabihy of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 44 J. ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 272
(1949) (agreement on diagnosis ranged from 45%-60%); Spitzer, Quantifiaton of Agreement in Psychiatric Diag-
nosis, 17 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 83 (1967); Beck, Rehability of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 19 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
351 (1962) (agreement even lower [54%] among experienced psychiatrists).
203. For the stigmatization of labeling, see, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. at 492 (1980).
204. See Ash, supra note 202; Beck, supra note 202; see also OSKAMPS, PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS No. 28
(1982).
205. This conclusion is well-accepted clinically but is not totally accurate. The reliability is based
primarily on the extreme symptoms which are accepted as a basis for the definition of the illness. See
generally I AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, Part 6 (S. Aristi 2d ed. 1974).
206. The variance is due primarily to the differences in training and theoretical points of view. A
psychiatrist trained in organic pathology will view diagnosis and mental illness differently from one trained
in psychodynamic theory and psychoanalysis. However, areas of overlaps will remain especially in extreme
cases. See generally J. ZISKIN, supra note 47, at 251-89.
207. Psychiatrists frequently base a decision as to method of treatment on the patient's diagnosis.
Methods include use of medication, psychotherapy, type of interaction, frequency of visits, and estimated
length of treatment. Prognosis, of course, depends on the patient's response to the treatment given, as well
as the diagnosis.
208. See State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975); Sadoff, Indicatoisfor Involunita Hospitaliation:
Dangeroumess ofMental Illness?, in LAw AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS 297 (1978).
209. See H. STEADMAN & J. COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE (1974); J. MONAHAN,
THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981).
210. See J. MONAHAN, supra note 209, at 77.
211. Id at 71.
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tions, and behavior of the patient with the examiner;21 2 and (3) psychiatric conclu-
sions based on history and interviews, including such factors as impulse, control,
hostility to self or others, degree of insight, judgment, ability to express anger, and
means of expressing violent behavior.21 3 A person, for instance, may be considered
dangerous at home or in the community, but his illness and his behavior may be
well-controlled if he is given adequate treatment in a highly structured environ-
ment with proper monitoring of his daily activities. 2
14
The degree of competency necessary for a patient to help structure his own
treatment-including the threshold question of whether he should be hospitalized,
or whether he should receive various types of medication-has not been ade-
quately defined in the law.2 15 Some psychiatrists became concerned about compe-
tency when courts began to uphold the rights of involuntarily committed patients
to refuse medical treatment. 2 16 The courts declared varying standards of refusal,
based to some extent on the competency of the patient, i.e., a refusal could not be
based on the patient's delusional system or could not be a direct result and/or
influence of his illness. Rather, his refusal, to be competent, must be rationally
based. 21 7 Similarly, in commitment proceedings, the patient may be competent to
challenge a hospitalization decision, even though the examining psychiatrist deter-
mines that the patient is potentially dangerous. 218
Unlike dangerousness, competency is rarely assessed in commitment proceed-
ings. 219 The court may decide upon the commitment of a person for a limited
period of time on the basis of his mental illness and dangerousness, but not because
of incompetency. In virtually all jurisdictions in the United States, commitment is
212. Id. at 101.
213. Id at 91.
214. See, e.g., State v. Krol, 68 N.J. at 260, 344 A.2d at 302: "A defendant may be dangerous in only
certain types of situations or in connection with relationships with certain individuals. An evaluation of
dangerousness in such cases must take into account the likelihood that defendant will be exposed to such
situations or come into contact with such individuals"; see also State v. Johnson, 8 Or. App. 263, 493 P.2d
1386 (1972) (defendant potentially dangerous to her children but unlikely to have iaccess to them). See
generally State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 302-07, 390 A.2d 574, 596-600 (1978).
215. Although state-level "Patients' Bill of Rights" often stipulate, for example, that "every patient
shall have the right to participate in planning for his own treatment to the extent that his condition
permits," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.1 (West 1980), the question of the influence of the patient's condition
on his participation in the planning process has not been litigated. Similarly, while cases like Rennie v.
Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982), and Rogers v. Okin, 634
F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982), discuss the
question of competency and medication refusal, the issue is not one which has been frequently decided.
For a recent psychiatric view of this issue, see Roth, Competency to Consent to or Refuse Treatment, in AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC AssoCIATION ANNUAL REVIEW-1982 (Grinspoon ed.) On the specific question of a
patient's capacity to consent to hospitalization, see Appelbaum, Mirkin, & Bateman, An Empi'rical Assessment
of Competency to Consent to Psychiatric Hospitalization, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1170 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Appelbaum].
216. It should be emphasized that cases such as Rennie are limited to the refusal of antipsychotic
drugs. See 653 F.2d at 839 n.2.
217. The impact of competency on refusal decisions is best articulated in Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. 1131, 1194 (D.N.J. 1978), supp. order 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979),modifwd, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir.
1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982); see also Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d, 650, 660-61 (1st Cir.
1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982).
218. See, e.g., In re R.B., 158 N.J. Super. 542, 386 A.2d 893 (App. Div. 1978); In re R.N., 170 N.J.
Super. 394, 406 A.2d 973 (App. Div. 1979).
219. Compare, e.g., N.J. Ct. R. 4:74-7 (1982) (commitment) with N.J. Ct. R. 4:83 (1982) (guardianship).
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not equated with incompetency. The committed patient retains all civil rights
except liberty for a specific period of time.220
The involuntary commitment of a patient leads to another question: Does the
involuntary commitment order imply that the court has implicitly found that the
patient is incompetent to choose his place of treatment?2 2 1 While incompetency is
generally not specifically adjudicated at commitment hearings, in at least one
jurisdiction, Utah 2 22 commitment is impermissible without a preexisting finding
of incompetency. 223 To many treating psychiatrists, the Utah approach is reason-
able because it deals with one of the most critical legal-medical issues arising
during hospitalization: The extent of the state's power to medicate a patient
against his will. The Utah approach is supported by decisions such as Rennle
which hold, unequivocally, that the right to refuse treatment is protected by both
liberty interests and the requirement of least restrictive alternative. 224 Such hold-
ings may raise further ethical dilemmas for the treating psychiatrist. 22 5
A second major concern for the psychiatrist in commitment proceedings is the
notion of agency: whom does the psychiatrist represent and to whom does he owe
his loyalties when he examines a client, defendant or patient?226 Generally, the
psychiatrist represents the interest of the patient no matter who has asked him to
conduct the examination. If he is called as an examining psychiatrist by the
patient, then his allegiance is clearly to the patient and his duty is to consider the
patient's condition carefully and recommend optimal treatment. Although the
psychiatrist is primarily concerned with the patient's best medical interests, he
remains an agent of the patient's attorney. "[T]he effective assistance of counsel
• . .demands recognition that a defendant be as free to communicate with a psy-
chiatric expert as with the attorney he is assisting.
'2 2 7
A court-appointed psychiatrist has a similar function. Though he acts for the
court, his allegiance is to the patient and his perception of the patient's best med-
ical interests. He must, of course, explain to the patient at the time of the exami-
nation that he is appointed by the court to conduct the examination and that he
will report his findings to the court. If the psychiatrist is a hospital-affiliated psy-
220. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2c (West 1980) ("No patient may be presumed to be incom-
petent because he has been examined or treated for mental illness, regardless of whether such evaluation or
treatment was voluntarily or involuntarily received"); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 896, 904 (D.
Conn. 1974).
221. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 215 (contrasting de jure and de facto commitments); see also Roth, A
Commitment Law for Patients, Doctors and Lawyers, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 1121 (1979).
222. UTAH CODE ANN. § 6 7 -7-36(10)(c) (West 1980).
223. This statute has been construed in A.E. v. Mitchell, No. C 78-466 (D. Utah 1980). The court
held that the plaintiffs right to refuse treatment could be overridden, in part, because of this statutory
incompetency finding. For a psychiatric analysis of the case, see Lebegue & Clark, Incompetence to Refuse
Treatment. A Necessany Condition for Civil Commitment, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1075 (1981).
224. 653 F.2d 836, 843-48 (3d Cir. 1981).
225. However, the patient who is adjudicated incompetent at the time of his commitment may, upon
receiving adequate treatment in the hospital, improve his mental condition and regain his competency to
decide what treatment he wishes shortly after admission. See, e.g., Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Tests of Competency to
Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977).
226. For an excellent analysis of the "dual loyalty" issue, see Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of
Dual Loyalties, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 7 (F. Ayd ed. 1974).
227. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975).
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chiatrist, his allegiance is still primarily to the patient, and he must focus his con-
cern on his perception of the patient's medical interest rather than the patient's
wishes. He may recommend hospitalization even over the protest of the patient
whom he has examined.
The hospital-affiliated psychiatrist, however, faces different ethical questions
than does the neutral, appointed psychiatrist. The former may be the treating
psychiatrist who has recommended recommitment, or the psychiatrist who
examined the patient during a brief period of emergency commitment to the hos-
pital and recommended a longer period of commitment. He may, in fact, be
required to treat the patient in the hospital if the judge commits the patient. This
psychiatrist must then be in a position to testify against the patient whom he will
subsequently treat. This situation poses a difficult problem for some treating psy-
chiatrists who have not properly prepared their patients for testifying nor con-
vinced the patients of the sincerity of their concern for the patients' medical needs.
Some complain that the commitment proceedings in these cases pit the patient
against his doctor in an antitherapeutic manner.
228
Another potential ethical concern of the hospital-affiliated psychiatrist is the
legal and ethical conflict of interest inherent in recommending commitment in a
hospital where the psychiatrist stands to profit from the commitment. These con-
flicts arise primarily in private psychiatric hospitals, but may also arise in state
hospitals where psychiatrists may recommend extended commitment to continue
with research projects that include the patient at risk. Obviously, no patient
should be involuntarily maintained in a hospital because he serves as a subject in a
research project. In any event, the judge and the patient's attorney must explore
the ulterior motives of hospital-affiliated psychiatrists recommending commit-
ment. If a hospital-affiliated psychiatrist has a conflict of interest, he should dis-
qualify himself from the hearing. Instead, a neutral psychiatrist should testify
primarily on the medical facts of the case about retention or recommitment to the
hospital. 229
The psychiatrist called by the patient's attorney may face an ethical dilemma.
The psychiatrist's legal allegiance is to the patient's attorney, who is presumably
looking for a psychiatric opinion that would support the wishes of his client.
230
Even in this situation, the psychiatrist must evaluate the best medical interests of
the patient and render an honest opinion to the attorney. 23' The advocate must
represent the desires of the patient, but the psychiatrist must remain cognizant of
the medical needs of the patient despite the circumstances of his entry into the
case. He retains an ethical responsibility to assess properly the medical and psychi-
228. Whether this is, in fact, antitherapeutic, is open to debate. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 109.
229. A neutral psychiatrist who has no interest in the outcome of the hearing should be appointed by
the court in order to have available all data and records, to be as objective as possible, and, most impor-
tantly, to give the patient a feeling of confidence that the assessment is conducted by an bndependent psychia-
trist in no way connected with or appointed by the hospital.
230. See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3rd Cir. 1975). On the other hand, lawyers seek
expert psychiatric opinions for many reasons. See generally Perlin, supra note 19.
231. This, of course, presumes that the question sought to be answered is one relevant to the issue of
"medical interests." An assessment of need of medication may be very different from one dealing with
competency to stand trial. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
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atric problems and, where appropriate, recommend optimal treatment. If his
assessment of the patient does not coincide with the needs of the patient's attorney,
that attorney has the option of not calling that particular psychiatrist to the
hearing. He also has the option of bringing in a second (or tenth) opinion that
may more closely coincide with hi's professional needs, i.e., the wishes of his client.
What is the position of the psychiatrist who renders an opinion which is dif-
ferent from the opinions of the two or ten psychiatrists who have previously recom-
mended hospitalization? The second, fifth, tenth, or twentieth psychiatrist called
by the attorney may ethically formulate an opinion that differs from that of his
colleagues and may present this opinion in court. However, he should be aware of
the conclusions and opinions of his predecessors and the data on which they based
their opinions. This psychiatrist must also document the sources of his data and be
able to defend his opinion when challenged in court.
Regardless of who calls the psychiatrist for consultation and assessment, the
psychiatrist who has any conflict of interest should absent himself from the com-
mitment proceedings. For example, if the hospital wishes to discharge a patient or
transfer him to another hospital because his insurance coverage has expired, but
the treating psychiatrist recognizes that his therapeutic relationship with the
patient is essential to the patient's continued improvement, the psychiatrist has a
clear conflict of interest if he recommends transfer or discharge. The conflict is
heightened if the transfer facilities are inferior to the private hospital facilities
where the patient is currently receiving treatment. A conflict also arises if the
treating psychiatrist would profit from a recommendation that the patient remain
in the private hospital. If necessary the psychiatrist should explain his situation
under oath. The court must then make appropriate fact-findings and legal conclu-
sions. If the judge ultimately rules on the patient's case, the conflict is removed
and both the patient and the psychiatrist will have received benefits from the
proceeding.
Although psychiatrists often complain about the number and extent of judicial
proceedings involving commitment and treatment decisions, the court's involve-
ment tends to protect the psychiatrist in conflict cases. Psychiatric decisions to
release or retain a patient sometimes form the basis of negligence suits alleging
premature release. 23 2 When courts, rather than psychiatrists, decide release ques-
tions, the doctor is partially insulated from the potential adverse effects of such
litigation.2 33
Before a psychiatrist examines a patient at the request of another party,
including the judge, the hospital, or attorneys not representing the patient, the
psychiatrist must inform the patient who he is, whom he represents, and what he
232. For the classic case, see Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); stee also McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (Law Div.
1979). Note, however, that the Tarasof/Mclniosh line of cases has not received unanimous approval in the
courts. See, e.g., Case v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 317 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
233. This, however, raises another troubling question: Will this reliance on the courts to "take the
weight" for release decisions cause patients to languish in hospitals for inappropriately long time periods
when, for instance, there are long gaps between court dates? This issue has been the object of almost no
judicial or academic attention.
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will do with the information he receives from the interview and examination. In
addition, the psychiatrist must disclose to the patient the potential harm which
may flow from the examination. Where a court-appointed psychiatrist was asked
to determine the competence of a defendant at a pretrial hearing in a capital case,
and was then called as a witness by the state at a post-conviction "death penalty"
hearing to testify about the defendant's dangerousness, the testimony was ruled
inadmissible as a violation of both the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and his sixth amendment right to counsel. 234 The
Supreme Court noted:
The fact that respondent's statements were uttered in the context of a psychiatric examina-
tion does not automatically remove them from the reach of the Fifth Amendment ....
The state trial judge, sua sponle, ordered a psychiatric evaluation of respondent for the lim-
ited, neutral purpose of determining his competency to stand trial, but the results of that
inquiry were used by the State for a much broader objective that was plainly adverse to
respondent. Consequently, the interview with Dr. Grigson [the psychiatrist] cannot be char-
acterized as a routine competency examination restricted to ensuring that respondent
understood the charges against him and was capable of assisting in his defense. Indeed, if
the application of Dr. Grigson's findings had been confined to serving that function, no
Fifth Amendment issue would have arisen.
2 3 5
The ethical considerations implicit in the commitment process in this case are
clear: A psychiatrist must inform the person he is examining that (1) he is a psy-
chiatrist, (2) he is performing an evaluation for possible commitment to the hos-
pital (i.e., a restriction on his liberty), and (3) what the patient tells him may be
used in support of commitment. Unless the examining psychiatrist discloses this
information to the patient at the time of the examination, he is not acting ethi-
cally. He is depriving the patient of the opportunity to refuse to provide informa-
tion which might be used in support of an application for commitment.
The examining psychiatrist must be cognizant of numerous ethical considera-
tions, including the duty to preserve the confidentiality of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship. In essence, the psychiatrist must not reveal what is entrusted to him in
the course of his treatment of the patient.2 36 However, in many cases involving
assessment of patients for commitment to hospitals, no traditional doctor-patient
relationship is ever established. The doctor does not treat the patient; rather, he
assesses him for potential commitment to the hospital. Strict confidentiality
cannot be preserved in this situation because the psychiatrist must ultimately
present his findings in court so that the judge may make a proper determination
and disposition.2 37 Therefore, the psychiatrist must explain to the patient that
there is no doctor-patient relationship in this particular setting, and there should
be no expectation of secrecy or confidentiality. The psychiatrist does promise that
234. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 466-69 (1981).
235. Id at 465.
236. See Statement on Ethicsfor Psychiatrists, supra note 196, § 9, at 1063:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance,
or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or
unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.
237. Of course, many confidentiality statutes include exceptions to cover precisely this type of situa-
tion. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.3(3) (West 1980) (a court may direct disclosure if it "is necessary
for the conduct of proceedings before it"). See generally N.J. CT. R. 4:74-7 (1982).
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he will not divulge inappropriately (or to persons not having a direct involvement
in the commitment proceeding) any of the material that he has learned.
Privileged communications, which are generally protected by statute or court
rule, 238 also apply to the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship. -2 39 In the
course of the assessment for commitment, there is no privilege; i.e., the psychiatrist
may testify in court even if the examinee protests and states that he refuses to "give
permission" for the psychiatrist to testify before the judge.240
Similarly, the examining psychiatrist does not need the informed consent of the
patient before testifying. However, he must tell the examinee who he is, whom he
represents, and what he will do with the information he receives. 24' The patient
must have the opportunity to refuse to speak to the psychiatrist. 2 42 If the court
orders the patient to speak to the psychiatrist, then the patient must comply; how-
ever, absent such an order or mandate, the patient is free to refuse to discuss his
medical condition. On the other hand, if the court deems the situation an emer-
gency, in certain jurisdictions the patient may be committed against his will
without a full psychiatric assessment. 24 3
For the patient to give effective consent after receiving proper information
about the examination, he must be competent to receive the information and to
make a decision about cooperating. Basically, if the patient is competent to make
decisions about his treatment, then he should be given every opportunity to do so
by the psychiatrist, as well as by the court.
Another ethical dilemma arises if the psychiatrist encourages the patient to
divulge information to him. If the psychiatrist is also the treater and encourages
the patient to tell him "everything that is on your mind," what are the psychia-
trist's responsibilities if he is told self-incriminating information? If his patient
divulges that he has killed two people, does the psychiatrist have an ethical or legal
duty to inform the police? 24 4 Attitudes vary; in some cases, the psychiatrist may
238. See, e.g., N.J. R. EvID. 26A-2; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-22.1 to 22.9 (physician-patient privi-
lege); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:14B-28 (psychologist-client privilege).
239. Thus, under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84-22.1(a), "'patient' means a person who, for the sole pur-
pose of securing preventive, palliative or curative treatment, or a diagnosis preliminary to such treatment,
of his physical or mental condition, consults a physician, or submits to an examination by a physician."
240. Generally, there is no privilege (since there is no doctor-patient relationship), except in the case
of the treating psychiatrist testifying in court to have his patient committed. See United States v. Alvarez,
519 F.2d 1036 (3rd Cir. 1975). The trial court forced the psychiatrist to testify against a defendant whom
he had examined at the request of defense counsel. The third circuit held that this compulsion violated the
defendant's sixth amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel. Id at 1045-47.
241. See Statement of Ethts for Psychiatrsts, supra note 196, § I, at 1061.
242. The patient may be advised by his attorney not to cooperate with a particular psychiatrist if the
attorney believes that decision to be in his client's best interest. The legal strategies are of no concern to
the examining psychiatrist; he is under no legal or ethical obligation to "get the information" or conduct
the examination.
On the other hand, if a criminal defendant chooses to plead not guilty by reason of insanity, the general
rule is that he cannot refuse to speak to a state-appointed psychiatrist on that issue. See, e.g., State v.
Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 11, 210 A.2d 763, 774 (1965).
243. See, e.g., 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7502 (West 1979).
244. The typical privilege statute is silent on this issue. The New Jersey law, for instance, lists only the
following exceptions:
There is no privilege under this act as to any relevant communication between the patient and his
physician (a) upon an issue of the patient's condition in an action to commit him or otherwise place
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decide to call the police if, after discussing the matter with the patient, he believes
the patient is telling the truth. The psychiatrist should encourage the patient to
tell the police himself, and perhaps should offer to accompany the patient to the
police station. For lesser criminal matters, such actions might not be
appropriate.
245
With respect to commitment, however, the psychiatrist may use criminal infor-
mation supplied by the patient to evaluate his dangerousness. Certainly, if the
patient discloses a plan to harm someone or to engage in other criminal behavior,
the psychiatrist is under no duty to withhold that information. His duty as a cit-
izen includes both an obligation to protect his patient from the consequences of
criminal behavior, and, under the appropriate circumstances, a duty to warn the
intended victims of his patient's violence. 246 He may fulfill this duty by recom-
mending commitment. 247
Whether a patient is competent to give consent constitutes another major eth-
ical problem in commitment proceedings. Patients may agree to voluntary treat-
ment even though they are mentally ill and incompetent to understand the
implications of their agreement. Some psychiatrists feel that voluntary treatment
for patients is better than involuntary commitment. 248 They argue that voluntary
patients suffer fewer abridgements of liberty, 249 avoid the embarassment of an
him under the control of another or others because of alleged mental incompetence, or in an action to
recover damages on account of conduct of the patient which constitutes a criminal offense other than
a misdemeanor, or (b) upon an issue as to the validity of a document as a will of the patient, or (c)
upon an issue between parties claiming by testate or intestate succession from a deceased patient.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-22.3. See generally N.J. R. EVID. (Anno. 1980); N.J. R. EviD. 26A-2 comment 4
at 157-58.
245. It should be noted that this distinction is arbitrary and highly individual in application. Each
therapist must decide for himself where to "draw the line" regarding the reporting of self-incriminating
information. The doctor has to decide why the patient is revealing the information, what he wants the
doctor to do with it and what course of action would be most beneficial to the patient. Where human life is
lost or seriously in jeopardy, the psychiatrist does not have the same options as he does in the case of lesser
crimes.
246. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976).
247. The psychiatrist is under a duty both to help his patient and to protect the intended victim. He
is not under a strict duty to warn the victim if he can help his patient in a different way. Certainly, if the
doctor is successful in hospitalizing the patient (either voluntarily or involuntarily), it is likely that the
putative victim will be spared. However, if the doctor feels there is no proper treatment available in the
hospital, he may face the dilemma of choosing to commit the patient anyway to prevent specific violence,
or to inform the patient's family, the police, or the intended victim as possible alternatives to hospitaliza-
tion.
He does have the duty, to the greatest extent possible, to prevent his patient from harming another
person. By such prevention, he may not only save the intended victim's life but also spare his patient the
difficulties attendant to killing another and facing subsequent criminal sanction. Neither of these latter
options would be in the patient's best mental health interests. For an analysis of these issues, see Wexler,
Patients, Therapists and Third Parties. The Victimological Virtues of Tarasof 2 INT'L J.L. & Psici. 1 (1979).
248. See Applebaum, supra note 215. Most psychiatrists have long accepted the notion that voluntary
patients were more successfully treated than were involuntary ones. Motivation for treatment is seen as a
positive force, as contrasted to resistance common among involuntary patients.
249. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the distinction between "voluntary" and "involun-
tary" patients is often "illusory." Herr, Civil Rights, Uncivil Asylums and the Retarded, 43 U. CINN. L. REV.
679, 722 (1974). "The 'voluntary' resident may even have fewer opportunities for discharge than those
involuntarily committed. Id. at 723. See generally Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121, 1124 (1st Cir.
1976); New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
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open court proceeding,250 and are spared the publicity of such a hearing. 25 ' Pri-
marily, they believe that voluntary treatment is more effective than involuntary
therapy. 252 However, involuntary commitment does afford due process protection
for the individual. The patient receives periodic court hearings to assess his need
for continued hospitalization. But the ethical question arises whether the benefits
of voluntary commitment outweigh the danger that such patients may be incom-
petent to sign their voluntary status and are thus "illegally" hospitalized. 253 They
also may be unable to fully comprehend the meaning of their legal rights, for
example, the right to contest commitment. Furthermore, they may not be compe-
tent to give consent for treatment, though they are often encouraged to sign the
form for such treatment. 254
The admitting psychiatrist may believe that voluntary commitment is "for the
patient's own good." He may recognize the patient has no other place to go, and
that if the patient returns to the community he may be unable to protect him-
self.25 5 Because these proceedings are not involuntary hearings, the patient does
not have an attorney representing him, and is subject to the arbitrary, though
sometimes beneficent, intentions of the assessing psychiatrist. 256
Traditionally, the psychiatrist treats the patient only after the patient has been
sent to the hospital. A psychiatrist's role changes if he is examining and assessing a
person for hospitalization, especially if the criteria for commitment include "dan-
gerousness" as well as mental illness. In this case the psychiatrist becomes a party
to "incarcerating" the patient, a role which may jeopardize the subsequent doctor-
patient treatment relationship. 257 If the patient believes the docter has recom-
(subsequent citations omitted) (voluntarily admitted patients treated no differently than involuntarily
admitted patients); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71, 73 (D. Neb. 1973).
As the court noted in Cospito v. Califano, 89 F.R.D. 274, 380 (D.N.J. 1981), "[E]ven voluntary patients
may be retained in the hospital against their will for observation periods and such persons are subject to
formal, involuntary commitment procedures."
250. However, in most jurisdictions, the commitment hearing is now held in camera "unless good cause
to the contrary is shown." See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 4:74-7(e) (1982).
251. This argument appears questionable, in light of the predominance of in camera proceedings. See
supra note 250.
252. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) ("[T]he testimony has indicated
that involuntary treatment is much less effective than the same treatment voluntarily received").
253. On the parallel question of a criminal defendant's competency to plead guilty, compare United
States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1976) and Seiling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir.
1973) (defendant's competency must be assessed "with specific reference to the gravity of the decisions with
which [he] is faced") with State v. Norton, 167 N.J. Super. 229, 232, 400 A.2d 810, 811 (App. Div. 1979)
(same test applies to competency to stand trial as to competency to plead guilty).
254. See, e.g., 50 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 7201-07 (West 1980).
255. This specific matter is before the court in In re S.L., No. A-47 (N.J. App. Div., Feb. 24, 1982),
reprinted in 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 381 (1981), cert. granted, N.J. Sup. Ct., May 20, 1982.
256. The oft-repeated admonition of Mr. Justice Brandeis is appropriate in this setting:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government's
purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by
evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 479 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
257. See, e.g., Collins, The Rights of Mental Health Professionals, 44 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIc 291, 294
(1980), noting that the psychiatrist has "the right to define the characteristics of the clinical setting that
will best serve the purpose of goal achievement." Collins' concern is the role of the psychiatrist in aiding
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mended confinement, then the psychiatrist may have great difficulty establishing
therapeutic rapport with that patient.
Placing the patient back in the same hospital under the care of the same doctor
could pose treatment difficulties. The psychiatrist may be unable to conduct one-
on-one psychotherapy or effectively work with the patient following a court deci-
sion to continue commitment. 258 This is especially true if cross-examination at the
commitment hearing leads to the inference that the psychiatrist does not "fully
understand" his patient. If the psychiatrist explains his position to the patient
prior to the hearing, the patient may, even after being represented aggressively
and convincingly by an adversary attorney, return to the hospital for treatment in
a more positive frame of mind. The patient may develop a sense of trust in the
doctor with whom he did not agree, but whom he believes has his best medical
interest in mind.
Nevertheless, most psychiatrists have traditionally disagreed with court
involvement in the commitment decision. They argue that the law ill-advisedly
takes away the responsibility of the psychiatrist who has more expertise in assessing
what the patient needs. 259 Such an attitude is inappropriate. As noted above, the
legal proceedings protect the patient's liberty and protect the competent patient's
right to make decisions about his treatment.2 6 °
The proceedings also provide legal protection for testifying psychiatrists. Com-
mitment is not a strictly medical matter; it involves judicial concern with the lib-
erty of patients, and psychiatrists must accept their increasingly limited role in
these proceedings. The psychiatrist performs a legitimate function when he
advises the court about the mental illness of the patient to be committed, about
the clinical conditions under which a particular patient may be violent either to
himself or to others, and about the effect of a particular mental illness on a
patient's ability to function in a particular community or hospital setting. How-
ever, the courts are charged with making final decisions about commitment and
retention based on statute, case law, and court rule.
IV
CONCLUSION
Freshman year college philosophy courses often include the proverb about the
three Martians and the elephant. The moral to be drawn-that everything
the courts in detaining a person by permitting the hospital to become "an extension of the jail," a role he
considers both inappropriate and antitherapeutic.
258. This, of course, assumes that such psychotherapy is, in fact, available in the institution to which
the person is in danger of commitment. For perhaps a more realistic view, see Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d
117, 131-32 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3474 (1982) (plaintiff, a state hospital resident,
met with treatment team 10 to 15 minutes per month, and had not received any psychiatric counseling for
one-and-a-half years before trial).
259. On the importance of "turf" issues, see Issues n Debate: The Rght to Refuse Treatment, I ADVOCACY
Now 8 (1979).
260. This matter was put to rest in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.10 (1975), where the
court labeled as "plainly unacceptable" the notion that it was somehow inappropriate for courts to involve
themselves in treatment decisions "where 'treatment' is the sole asserted ground for depriving a person of
liberty."
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depends on perspective-is equally applicable to the topic under consideration in
this paper. The attorney's paramount ethical concerns center on his ability to
represent competently his client's self-expressed interests and desires; on the other
hand, the doctor's primary problem concerns his perceptions of the conflict
between these wishes and medical need. In each instance, the choice of profes-
sional perspective-sometimes characterized as the adversary advocate or the
benevolent care-giver--colors the determination of all issues. Although some of
the ethical conflicts discussed cannot easily be resolved or disposed of with finality,
it is critical for practitioners of both disciplines to come together to discuss and
analyze their common problems in order better to share, and perhaps even try to
harmonize, their perspectives.
